

prior censorship did not exist for Church publications and that it was permitted to publish with relative freedom, was one of the windows of opportunity that was utilised by the Catholic nationalists. The number of Catalan-language Church publications continued to increase and in 1959 *Serra d'Or* was founded as a cultural and religious monthly in the Catalan language. Catalan identity, language and culture had survived the attempt at their elimination and, as we have seen, the Francoist monolith failed in its programme of cultural homogenisation. Whilst the reconstruction of Catalan culture would expand, the regime would resist all advances made by it. However, this resistance to Catalanist revival gradually weakened in the terrain of culture. Containment of political manifestations of Catalan nationalism remained firmly in place. Yet it would be economic modernisation, large-scale Spanish-speaking immigration and social transformation that would be the key challenge for the Catalan national movement in the years to come.

3

Revival, 1955–1970

We have been involved in the . . . struggle of the Catalan people for their national rights . . . this struggle manifests itself principally through the multiplication of indigenous folkloric celebrations, theatrical productions . . . and other cultural acts in the Catalan language . . . we are witnessing a promising resurgence . . . Catalan folklore is experiencing a flowering without precedent.¹

By the middle of the 1950s, the outlines of a new correlation of political forces were apparent. The Catalan national movement, under the umbrella of the Catholic Church, consolidated the advances made in previous years. The forces of Catalan communism in the PSUC cemented their dominance in the anti-Francoist opposition and devoted its energy to two main areas: unity with other opposition forces and trade union activism. By the middle of the next decade, the interests of both sectors would increasingly overlap as Catalan society was transformed by large-scale Spanish-speaking immigration. At the same time, the Franco regime also appeared to be firmly consolidated and the changing international context gave to the regime an apparent legitimacy mostly due to the intensification of the Cold War.² The geo-strategic position of Spain, bordering France with access to Atlantic sea lanes and also being a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea, was fundamental to the regime's survival.³ Whilst the death of Stalin represented the end to one phase of the Cold War, the new leadership in the Soviet Union, continued to believe in the inevitability of socialist victory and the vulnerability of capitalism. Spain, where labour was subject to neo-military discipline and authoritarian modernisation was underway, was one key element in US overseas policy. Francoism was changing and as its international support was guaranteed, it increasingly evolved a combination of repression and pragmatism.

Catalan society and the political culture of its opposition was profoundly affected by these wider changes. Within the regime, a relative pluralism could increasingly be found, a testimony to its self-confidence. Whilst rigid hierarchical control was maintained, small openings were increasingly permitted in the terrain of culture. The important Catholic role in cultural production gave a distinctive outcome to these developments in the case of Catalonia. In 1955, *Serra d'Or* was launched as a publication of the choir of Montserrat. Initially, it was published in Spanish and Catalan but by 1957, apart from the occasional

article, it was written completely in Catalan. The religious-led Catalanisation was noted in an article by Anselm Albareda, who remarked that in 1956 there were 10,000 women in Catalonia who bore the name Montserrat, 'a fact which was unknown in previous centuries'.¹⁴ By late 1956 a parallel publication *Germinàbit* emerged. As was noted: 'Recently and quietly, and growing every day, Montserrat has begun again its editorial task, which dried up in a most violent way in 1936'.¹⁵

A Catholic-led reconstruction of Catalan civil society also occurred during this period. The most successful of the entities that survived in society were those that exhibited a Catholic cultural and moral component. It continued to be impossible for a secular-based Catalanism to re-emerge. Until the 1960s many of the movements of Catalan Catholicism were narrow in scope and membership, but the revival of *escoltisme* (the Catholic boy-scout movement) was the greatest contributor to a pre-mass mobilisation of the population. Through the scouts, large numbers of Catalan youth were given the opportunity to study the Catalan language, and were introduced to Catalan history and culture. The Catalan scouts closely followed the prescription of Lord Baden-Powell's scout movement, which he had founded in England as a paramilitary formation at the height of the British Empire. Although the existence of scout-type movements can be discerned in Catalonia in the period post-1913, the emergence of a Catalanist *escolta* movement in the 1950s had its origins in developments from the 1920s.¹⁶ The idea behind the creation of the Catalanist scouts lay with Josep Maria Batista i Roca. This movement incorporated elements of the indigenous early twentieth century *excursionista* tradition. For Marfany, 'going on excursions was to undertake Catalanism . . . and going on excursions meant going to "the land" and that land was Catalonia'.¹⁷ Batista i Roca published the *Manual d'Excursionisme* in 1927 and the following year made public his scouting manifesto: 'if we have been successful in ordering the anarchy that there has been in our language . . . why do we not also try and succeed in putting in order that chaotic attitude that exists in the Catalan young of today'.¹⁸ This reflects the importance given to scouting in terms of its social and socialising function within Catalan society.

The principal figure in the reconstruction of the Catalan scouting movement in the 1950s was Monsignor Antoni Batlle, who also incorporated *excursionista* traditions, and for whom scouting gave great opportunities for the individual: 'with a rucksack on [the] back . . . learning to make [yourselves] men and to love the word of God'.¹⁹ Batlle had been involved in *escoltisme* prior to the Civil War and during the late 1940s worked from within *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action) to revive it.²⁰ The initial emergence of the scouting movement in England was a response to a belief in the physical 'failings' of British manhood in the Boer War.²¹ Amongst the figures within Catalan Catholicism who supported the scouts there was a belief in the need for a re-invigoration of the Catalan 'national spirit'. The Catalanist educationalist Alexandre Galí commented in 1958, 'what gives strength to *escoltisme* is the military spirit . . . within it'.²² Although the scouts had a great deal of protection under the 'umbrella' of the Catholic Church, their activities did not escape the attention

of the state, particularly the *Falange*. The *Falange* youth movement saw the *escoltas* as not only rivals for youth mobilisation, but as dangerous 'separatists'.²³

1955 was once again an international year of the Virgin Mary and the *Centre Excursionista de Catalunya* (Ramblers' Association of Catalonia) declared, 'our centre cannot fail to express its support for the Marian Year that the whole Catholic world has celebrated'.²⁴ For *Serra d'Or*, 'the *Moreneta* has endowed our national dance with life since the *Renaixença* . . . Happy are the people that can pray by dancing'.²⁵ One Catalanist commented in 1955, 'I am convinced . . . of the vitality of Catalanism . . . in fact I believe that today, Catalanism is . . . the only living force in Spain'.²⁶ The reconstruction of civil society extended from the boy scouts to the *Orfeò Català*, which had a membership of over 3,000 in 1957.²⁷ The *sardana* expanded its range and became confirmed as the national dance, displacing remaining local and regional dances that had resisted its hegemony.²⁸ These societies remained discrete and subterranean, but their existence permitted the vertiginous ascent of Catalanism in the 1960s. In 1956, Josep Espar i Ticó revived the *Acadèmia de la Llengua Catalana* (Academy of the Catalan Language), and the addition to the group of the renowned historian Jaume Vicens Vives was interpreted as a 'major coup'.²⁹ Vicens gave talks to many of the Catholic groups in his final years, and wrote to Abbot Escarré that 'the time has arrived to say "enough is enough" to enable us to save the Christian culture of Catalonia and the Catalan spirit of our people'.³⁰

Parallel to the growth of Catalanisation within the Church, there was also the first indication that a sector of the Church was also beginning to concern itself with social issues. One of the earliest signs of this came from within the *Congregacions Marianes* (Marian Congregations) and from a sector within *Acción Católica* who created a progressive Catholic monthly, *El Ciervo*, in 1951. However, it was not until the late 1950s that *El Ciervo*'s progressive nature became evident.³¹ This group created the publisher *Nova Terra* in 1957, which became the centre in Catalonia of the publication of works of progressive Catholicism, principally from France.³² The turn away from Spanish National Catholicism towards theological inspiration from France and Belgium also occurred amongst the principal writers in Catholic Catalanism who regularly cited figures such as Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Emmanuel Mounier, Charles Péguy and Jacques Maritain. These figures were marked by a belief in a form of communitarian Catholic thought defined broadly as Christian humanism. Maritain had set himself the task of establishing 'relevance between the Church and contemporary society'.³³ Firstly, the communitarian ideas appealed strongly to intellectuals who feared that Francoism had been successful in its atomisation of Catalan society. The second aspect of their appeal lay in the strategies for the re-Christianisation of the population. Communitarian inter-classism was a further element in this brand of Catholicism, as a project to transcend the class struggle. It must be recalled that leading Catalan Catholics such as Carles Cardó and Raimon Galí had experienced, at first hand, the rise of the anarchist movement and the anti-religious discourse of the Republic, as well as the outbreak of a proletarian revolution at the start of the Civil War.

Amongst the centres of Catholic Catalanist debate, one text in particular foreshadowed the aims and strategies adopted in the following years. This was the samizdat manuscript of Father Josep Armengou, *Justificació de Catalunya*. Armengou began composing this work in 1954 and the final text was circulated in 1958. In the opening pages Armengou ranged over the historical relations between Catalonia and Castile. He echoed the traditional Catalan sense of superiority towards the rest of Spain and argued that Spain belonged to the Arab League rather than to NATO. Catalonia, however, had a cultural and political origin that was completely European, Catalonia was western whilst Spain was Byzantine. Intolerance was central to this Spanish 'Arabism-Byzantinism': 'Between the flames of the Spanish Inquisition and the burning of churches in 1936 there is no essential difference.'²⁴ Armengou attached the blame for the assault on the Church in 1936 and Catalonia's strong tradition of anti-clericalism to Spanish machinations.²⁵ Changes in the composition of the Catalan population through the migration of large numbers, principally from the south of Spain, began to be a concern for Catalan nationalists. For Armengou, this immigration accentuated already existing tendencies of de-Christianisation. 'Catholic Spain has exported to Catalonia [a populace] that is totally irreligious . . . and has established as permanent institutions misery, prostitution, flamenco and delinquency.' Armengou sensed the urgency of the moment and called on the Catholics of Catalonia to recognise that the time had arrived for 'the slow, personal but effective reconquest of Catalonia', the time was right to Catalanise Catalonia.²⁶ In a study prepared in the late 1950s, the communists of the PSUC noted that the new nationalist generations had broken with the ERC and the *Lliga*. Furthermore, the PSUC noted the growth of Catalanist sentiment amongst the bourgeoisie and that 'Catalan nationalism ever more affirms itself as a positive factor in the struggle against Francoism'.²⁷ Many of those opposed to the Francoist sclerosis of the mid 1950s lamented the continued quiescence of most of the Catalan bourgeoisie. However, unbeknownst to many, a small stratum of the bourgeoisie was about to undertake a strategy of *nationalist* revival.

Franco's Spain began to experience the first indications of structural change. In 1957, the Franco regime was forced to acknowledge the bankruptcy of its economic policy of autarchy and this recognition culminated in the incorporation of members of *Opus Dei*, a religious-technocratic organisation, into the Spanish government. Amongst those who were members of *Opus* were representatives of the Catalan bourgeoisie such as Laureano López Rodó.²⁸ A loyal Francoist mayor in the important industrial town of Sabadell sent a report to Franco and called for an end to discrimination against Catalonia. 'For a long period of time the political situation within Catalonia has constituted a motive of deep concern.'²⁹ The regime's economic stabilisation plan was instituted in February 1957, itself a demonstration of the failure of the various economic remedies applied between 1951 and 1956.³⁰ The strongest indication that the widely noted quiescence of the Catalan bourgeoisie was being challenged was symbolised by the creation of the *Cercle d'Economia* (Economic Circle) in 1958. The stimulus to its creation was the initial project of European

union. Due to the dictatorship, Spain was not invited to participate in the creation of the EEC and attitudes towards the new entity reflected divisions within the regime between traditionalists and modernisers.³¹ The Catalan elites, whether incorporated within the regime or opposed to it, were strongly pro-European. As an anonymous text signed by a group of Catalan industrialists stated, 'a serious examination of the situation obliges us to recognise that we are a small, unfortunate, miserable and disoriented island in the middle of a prosperous Europe'. Another text noted that, 'if, for Spanish capital in general . . . the dictatorship is bad for business, for Catalan capital it is ruinous . . . our bourgeoisie has no power because the people it belongs to, Catalonia, has none either'.³²

It is from this period that we see the increasing activity of sectors within Catalan business. Some turned their attention to the banking sector. The decline within the Catalan banking sector over the course of the twentieth century was dramatic. The failure of Catalan banking was in marked contrast to its continued prominence in the Basque Country where it remained influential at an all-Spanish level. The collapse of the *Banco de Barcelona* in 1920 was 'the greatest disaster of the Catalan bourgeoisie of that era, which had been well represented on its board'.³³ For the following 40 years Catalan banking continued to contract.³⁴ The emergent nationalist business class sought to rectify this situation and create something approaching a national bank for Catalonia. This operation reflected the ever greater confidence within Catalan business. The origins of the creation of the *Banca Catalana* lay in the purchase of the *Banca Dorca* in 1959. Three figures from Catholic Catalanism were involved in this operation: Jordi Pujol, Jaume Carner and Salvador Casanovas, all of whom came from bourgeois families. Although the Spanish regime began to experience the penetration of the world market, much of the legacy of economic autarchy remained. This was thus a transitional phase for the Spanish economy. The creation of new banks was not yet permitted so it was through the purchase of another bank that *Banca Catalana* emerged. Once the bank's future had been secured it would play a prominent role in the financing of a wide range of Catalan cultural activities in the following decade. 1959 was a year that further confirmed the international consolidation of the dictatorship, with the entrance of Spain to the OCDE (forerunner of the OECD), and, as part of the strengthening of the Spanish economy's links with the outside world, the peseta was devalued. International status for the dictatorship was cemented following the encounter between the two generals, Eisenhower and Franco in the same year. Economic uncertainty and inflationary problems in the period 1957–1960 also brought about a hardening of the repressive apparatus of the state.

The 1950s saw a consolidation of the Franco regime but also the emergence of the first generation that had not lived through the Civil War as adults. Dissatisfaction with the narrowness of Spanish cultural life produced responses amongst alienated students in a university system that, although the preserve of the elite, gave indications that the Francoist monolith could be broken. One result of these changes was the student protests in Barcelona in

October 1956, which used as a pretext the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution and which led to the temporary closure of the University of Barcelona. The first phase of the student movement that emerged was divided between those supportive of the PSUC and those opposed to it.³⁵ The protests over Hungary had a special resonance in the Catalan case: the breach of a small nation's sovereignty and independence. The PSUC supported the official Soviet line and condemned the counter-revolutionary 'assault'.³⁶ Whilst 1956 marked the first phase in the opening up of the international communist movement, the suppression of Hungary confirmed the Spanish and Catalan anti-Francoist opposition's hostility to their own communist movements.³⁷ For the principal socialist force, the *Moviment Socialista de Catalunya*, their anti-communism can be traced to the creation of the PSUC in July 1936, which allied four movements of Catalan socialism and communism in a new political force but ultimately led to the end of their separate identities and Stalinist communist domination. Thus their hostility did not simply reflect a Cold War position but had specific Catalan origins. For the MSC, the dream of an independent Catalan socialist tradition had resulted in the 'deceit of socialists' and had led 'to their imprisonment and execution'.³⁸

Whilst Hungary represented a setback to the unitary strategy of the PSUC, international communism and its Catalan subsidiary were transformed by the death of Stalin and gradual de-Stalinisation. The first party congress of the PSUC took place in October 1956 and the former party leader Joan Comorera was condemned for the 'cult of personality' that had existed in the party. Whilst the party continued to believe in the imminent collapse of Francoism it also sought to emphasise its defence of Catalan identity. The party increasingly stated that the 'struggle for the re-establishment of Catalan national freedoms is to struggle for democracy in Catalonia and in all of Spain'.³⁹ In parallel with the PCE, party strategy shifted towards support for its strategy of national reconciliation. The PSUC also participated in the two one-day general strikes called in 1958 and 1959, both of which were dismal failures.

In 1962, the first large-scale outbreak of the new labour protest began in Asturias. Student protest became more prominent and the fracturing of the Church between a progressive priesthood and conservative hierarchy began to be more pronounced. In the late 1950s, the growing engagement of sectors of the Catholic Church with social and national identity would begin the slow erosion of the deeply-rooted Catalan anti-clerical tradition. This contributed to a shift in position by the communists towards the Catalan Church as during the tram strike of 1951 the party had condemned the Church for its 'demagogic propaganda' and had referred to clerics as 'missionaries of resignation'.⁴⁰ The PSUC would lead the movement of the Catalan left that gradually abandoned what it termed 'petit bourgeois anti-clericalism' and noted the increasingly positive relations that were developing between communists and workers belonging to *Acción Católica*.⁴¹ The first meetings for the constitution of the new labour organisation *Comissions Obreres* (Workers Commissions) CCOO took place in churches and were symbolic of the increasing commonality of purpose found between labour activists, whether

Catholic or communist. Ultimately these changes would facilitate unity within the trade union movement.⁴²

For communist party leader Gregorio López Raimundo, the changes taking place in the Church were of 'a far-reaching importance'.⁴³ These shifts were facilitated by changes in Rome with the papal encyclical *Pacem in Terris* permitting co-existence between communists and Catholics.⁴⁴ For the Franco regime, this alliance between communists and Catholics was a deeply damaging alliance, as in its own analysis, CCOO were, in 'terms of their inspiration, leadership, doctrine and tactics, a communist organisation'.⁴⁵ In 1966, the *Comissió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya* (National Workers Commission of Catalonia) was created. Unlike in the Basque Country or Galicia, no sizeable nationalist-led trades union movement developed in Catalonia. Catalan nationalism was unable to create a credible movement in the organised working class.⁴⁶ The CCOO which came to dominate the new Catalan labour movement adopted PSUC positions on the national question and the defence of Catalan language and identity. Immigration contributed to the consolidation of communist party strategy. The PSUC became a 'platform for integration' for the new immigrants as well as a school for training and activism.⁴⁷ As one immigrant party member put it, the party was the unifying point between 'national Catalonia and immigrants'.⁴⁸ Though, as has been noted, the identification of the immigrants with Catalonia was more political and social, rather than cultural.⁴⁹ The PSUC continually re-iterated that the struggle of the working class was inextricably linked to that of the national rights of Catalonia.⁵⁰

A Catalan exile publication based in Venezuela, *Solidaritat Catalana*, took note of the transformations that were occurring from within the Catalanist sections of the Church. 'There is a strong tendency on the part of many Catholic sectors to adopt a combative attitude against the regime ... we are able to affirm that Montserrat really is the spiritual centre of our homeland'.⁵¹ Before the consequences of these moves were apparent, the Catholic Catalanists confronted the regime in the most direct manner yet seen, and this perhaps reflected an over-confidence on their part at both their own strength and regime weakness. Members of the group known as *Crist i Catalunya* (CC) and the *Acadèmia de la Llengua Catalana*, attached to the Jesuits in Catalonia, undertook the two campaigns that were turning points in the strategic trajectory of Catholic-led Catalan nationalism. Members of both organisations had been previously involved in symbolic protest such as the placing of Catalan flags in prominent locations and in the 'P' campaign of the late 1950s, 'P' representing *Protesta* (Protest).⁵² The origins of the first campaign lay in remarks attributed to Luis Galinsoga, editor of *La Vanguardia Española* since 1939, at a mass he attended. The non-Latin sections of the mass had been given in Catalan and after the service Galinsoga went to complain to the priest and in the discussion that ensued Galinsoga declared: '*Todos los catalanes son una mierda*' (All Catalans are shits). It was of course the public use of Catalan that offended Galinsoga's sensibilities. After Galinsoga's remarks became publicised, CC and the *Acadèmia* began a campaign for his dismissal and they called

on subscribers and advertisers to boycott the paper. The popular resonance of this boycott was such that copies of *La Vanguardia* were burnt by school children and the campaign acted as an agent of politicisation for many young Catalans. It is estimated that *La Vanguardia* lost around 14,000 subscribers.⁵³ The financial losses incurred by the paper led finally to the dismissal of Galinsoga in early February 1960. All newspapers existed in a symbiotic relationship with the state and for the editor of a daily in Franco's Spain to be forced out due to a popular boycott was unprecedented. The fact that Galinsoga was removed gave the Catholic Catalanists a renewed confidence and confirmed Catholic prominence in the Catalan revival.⁵⁴

The raised level of consciousness and confidence on the part of the Catholic Catalanists culminated in the sequence of activities that came to be known as *els Fets del Palau* (the events of the Music Palace). The background to these events was Franco's decision to move the seat of government to Barcelona for a short period. 1960 was the centenary of Joan Maragall, the Catholic poet who had composed *El Cant de la Senyera*, a piece in homage to the Catalan national flag. A celebration of Maragall had been authorised to take place at the *Palau de la Música Catalana* in Barcelona, though at the last moment the civil governor prohibited the performance of *El Cant de la Senyera*. During the event at the *Palau*, a pre-planned rendition of the song led to the arrest of 16 individuals. These included Jordi Pujol and a printer, Francesc Pizón, responsible for a leaflet distributed at the time of Franco's arrival in Barcelona entitled, *Us Presentem General Franco* (Introducing General Franco). During Pujol's incarceration he was severely beaten by the police, who were enraged that the leaflet referred to Franco as a 'corruptor'.⁵⁵ The police brutality administered to Pujol and others reverberated amongst the sectors of Catholic Catalanism, who until this moment had experienced police vigilance but not violence. All of those arrested were 'respectable' members of Catalan society, and Pujol had recently been involved in the take-over of a bank. Pujol was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and he came to be seen as a symbol of Catalan nationalism. The 'P' campaign continued and Pujol's name increasingly displaced the word 'protesta'. The relationship Pujol-Catalonia was established at this time, with leaflets scattered proclaiming: *Visca Jordi Pujol. Visca Catalunya* (Long Live Jordi Pujol. Long Live Catalonia).⁵⁶ The attack on an individual who was close to Abbot Escarré began the abbot's distancing from the regime and led him to declare, 'the tortures and detentions constitute the sad epilogue to the time spent by the government in Barcelona'.⁵⁷

It is clear that in the late 1950s there was a growing tension between the state and Church in Catalonia, itself compounded by the economic problems experienced in the transition from autarchy to economic liberalisation. The response to *Els Fets del Palau* was clearly a regime decision to halt what the Catholic Catalanists believed was the onward march of their movement. The growing engagement of the Church with both Catalanism and the social question led the head of the *Falange* in Barcelona, Colonel Clavero, to declare, 'we will have to shoot those Catalan priests that the "Reds" did not kill'.⁵⁸ Although regime reaction to the events of 1960 was a setback, this was short lived and

the Catalan cultural community was about to embark on unprecedented period of cultural vitality. As an opposition leaflet made clear:

Following years of lassitude, due principally to police repression, the new Catalan generations have begun the process of reviving Catalonia and all Catalan people have become aware of this: the campaign against Galinsoga, the *Fets del Palau de la Música*, the reaction of many sectors of the citizenry against the beating administered to the detainees, the sentencing of Jordi Pujol in a Summary Military Tribunal, the decided attitude taken by the Abbot of Montserrat, [all of which] are, amongst many of the eloquent signs of the revival of the Catalans as a people.⁵⁹

In late 1962, the older exiled generation of the Spanish opposition held a meeting in Munich which brought together all major strands of the Francoist opposition, yet significantly continued to exclude the communists. This exclusion would continue until the very end of the regime, except in the Catalan case. The weakness of the PSOE in Catalonia determined a different outcome, as did the fact that 80 per cent of Catalan political prisoners belonged to the PSUC.⁶⁰ At the same time, the PSUC became ever more influential amongst intellectuals and the student protest movement.⁶¹ This development was pivotal in breaking down the culture of anti-communism. The ideological softening of the PSUC was symbolised by its call to open up the party to all anti-Francoists and indeed democrats.⁶² The PSUC had emerged as the 'national party of Catalonia' with 21 separate organisational structures throughout the country. It was 'a Marxist-Leninist party' that published in the 'language of the country': Catalan.⁶³ It had become the opposition party *par excellence*. By the early 1970s, it achieved the shift from vanguard party to a mass party and it would come to express more autonomy from the PCE.⁶⁴

The decade of the 1960s soon came to be called the *Segona Renaixença* (Second Renaissance), itself an echo of the Catalan revival of the nineteenth century and as such a symbol of Catalanist advance since 1939. The term *Renaixença* was already current at the end of the 1950s: 'The multiple cultural and artistic events of the past few years . . . have awoken the collective conscience of the country'.⁶⁵ *Renaixença* in the nineteenth century had referred to the rebirth of Catalonia in both the cultural and linguistic senses, and also to the economic changes that had transformed Catalonia. This duality was replicated in the 1960s, as new cultural and economic forms appeared. This period saw projects by the cultural opposition to have Catalan included in the school curriculum and to be included in the mass media forms of radio and television.

After the abandonment of economic autarky in 1957, the Spanish economy became increasingly entwined within the international economy. As was noted at the time, the Spanish economy had no alternative but to 'liberalise', as its previous salvation at the hands of American loans in 1952 was not available in the crises between 1957 and 1959.⁶⁶ Between the years 1960 and 1965, Spain carried out a series of structural reforms which included the dismantlement of

state controls on investment in small and medium-sized businesses and a large number of measures that favoured foreign investment.⁶⁷ The liberalisation, introduced by the Catholic technocrats of *Opus Dei*, enabled Spain to be a participant in the economic period termed the Golden Age.⁶⁸ This refers to the period in western Europe from the late 1940s until the early 1970s, when state and capital were allied in the active pursuit of economic growth. The Golden Age also witnessed a compromise between capital and labour known as the 'welfarist' consensus and this was also attempted in Franco's Spain through the strategy of fixed employment contracts and a series of welfare measures to ensure working-class quiescence and, therefore, economic stability. The integration of the Spanish economy into the western economic boom had a dramatic impact. After 1961, Spanish economic growth was second only to Japan in the western world and came to average 7 per cent annually. In 1964, as a further indication of its integration into the then reigning Keynesian model, Spain set in motion a series of four-year development plans.

In 1957, the first steps had been taken, principally led by west European Christian Democrats, in the creation of the European Economic Community. Due to its repressive apparatus and opposition to liberal democracy, the Spanish state was not included in these developments. According to de Blaye, 'fear of being excluded forever from the "construction of Europe" ... urged Franco to work towards entry into the Common Market'.⁶⁹ The fears of Spanish business at permanent exclusion (Spanish membership was rejected in 1962 and 1964) encouraged the creation of new lobbying groups and the Catalan business sector was in the forefront of pro-EEC associations. In 1957, the Catalan industrialist Miquel Mateu Pla became president of the *Comite Español de la Liga Europea de Cooperación Económica* (Spanish Committee of the European League of Economic Cooperation). The *Comite Español* set up its headquarters in the building of the historic representative of Catalan business, the *Fomento de Trabajo Nacional* (Promotion of National Work). This decision was a reflection of the importance of Catalan business as an interlocutor between the modernising west European bourgeoisie and its more traditional Spanish counterparts. The *Cercle d'Economia*, the newly created grouping of modernisers within Catalan business, organised a series of conferences that began in 1961 on the Costa Brava and brought together important business and political figures from Madrid and Barcelona.⁷⁰ The Spanish state passed the *Ordenación Bancaria* (Law of Banking Order) in 1962, thus breaking the status quo within the banking sector which had permitted the dominance of the larger banks. The new legislation gave preference to local banks and this gave impetus to the expansion of the *Banca Catalana*. By the end of the 1960s, *Banca Catalana* was the third largest bank in Catalonia.⁷¹ Its growth was viewed by the nationalist section of the business class as part of the base for the successful revival of the economy.

Though the decade would later reveal a crisis in the Church, threatened by the advance of secularisation, it also appeared that the long Catalan tradition of anti-clericalism was at an end. The end of this deeply-rooted anti-clericalism was facilitated by two factors. Firstly, the Catholic role in the revival of

the nationalist movement. Secondly, the emergence of social engagement in a sector of the Church. The social Catholics believed that it was vital to respond to the profound social questions created by the mass immigration to Catalonia. As *Nous Horitzons*, the theoretical journal of the PSUC noted: 'Catalonia ... the region of maximum working-class concentration has always attracted the attention of the Church', though 'the results [over the past 20 years] have not been particularly brilliant'.⁷² The pastoral work of the social Catholics was invariably conducted in Spanish, as the generally poor social conditions and low educational levels of the newly arrived were not conducive to linguistic Catalanisation. The decline in anti-clericalism and anti-Church feeling was also made possible through the strongest single element in the opposition to the Franco regime, the communists. The Catalan Communists of the PSUC began to see the Church as a potential ally in the new strategy of creating a broad-based opposition to the dictatorship. Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Spanish Communists, had called as early as 1956 for the Church to be incorporated to the struggle against the dictatorship. As *Nous Horitzons* put it, 'progressive Catholics [deserve] our support'.⁷³

The period of the early 1960s also signified an expansion and extension in opposition activity, itself a reflection of the fact that regime transformation was anticipated. The diffusion of exile publications expanded enormously as did a growth in the number, range and distribution of an internal oppositional press. The 1940s represented the near impossibility of opposition activity without encountering a brutal repression and the 1950s symbolised disillusion throughout the opposition at the apparent permanence of the dictatorship. The range of publications, their diffusion and ideological range, expanded vertiginously in the post-1965 period. New social actors, including a student protest movement and a new working class, were pivotal in the challenge the regime faced. Whilst in the Basque Country, a situation of political violence spiralled out of control, the challenge for the regime in Catalonia was the increasing merging of social and national demands. These years were a vivid demonstration that the Catalan national movement was in the ascendant. Within both the nationalist opposition and the regime's security services, which closely monitored developments, there existed the common recognition that a distinct Catalan reality had survived the attempt at its suppression. The regime continued to institutionalise the cultural phenomenon of Catalanism, in an attempt to control its development and, where possible, to co-opt aspects of it for the purposes of regime legitimisation. The presence of Franco's government in Barcelona in 1960 was officially celebrated by the presentation to the city of a compilation of Catalan Law, and a municipal charter. The regime made much of its victory parade in Barcelona in May 1960, which included a homage to the *sardana* by the Falangist vertical syndicalist union and other folkloric expressions of Catalan culture such as the human towers known as *castells*.⁷⁴ In official discourse this year became known as the 'Catalanist' spring of the regime.

The pattern of advance in the nationalist movement, some co-option by the regime and further advance by nationalism was repeated until the end of the

dictatorship. Legal changes in the state, brought about as a result of the market liberalisation of the Spanish economy, made easier the foundation of private corporations. The authorisation of *Omnium Cultural* was made in July 1961 and it was created with the aim of the promotion and support of all areas of Catalan language and culture.⁷⁵ *Omnium* became during the course of the 1960s a broad-based organisation of the Catalan cultural community. It described its aim as 'to coordinate the forces of all ... orientating them towards a single road'.⁷⁶ It was founded by bourgeois Catalans, who included industrialists, bankers and lawyers and brought together individuals who had supported both sides in the Civil War.⁷⁷ It was in the cultural terrain that the first expressions of Catalan unity were to be found and it was an area that was increasingly claimed by all, from communists to regime moderates. Though *Omnium* was not created as a Catholic organisation, Catalanist Catholics had a disproportionate role in the organisation. Over half of the Consultative Committee of *Omnium Cultural* were Catholics, two of whom were also members of religious orders.⁷⁸ Over the period of the existence of *Omnium*, this Catholic influence ensured that those aspects of Catalanism most imbued with historic Catholicism, from the *sardana* to the traditions of *excursionisme* were prioritised, and the publications of *Omnium* continued the cultural Catholicisation of Catalanism of the 1950s. *Serra d'Or* became the public forum of Catalanism and as the decade progressed it opened its pages to figures on the left. As a reflection of the growth of regime concern at *Serra d'Or*, as early as December 1960 the Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism compiled a study of it. This report noted that, 'it is clearly the case that the magazine is not religious ... taking advantage of Catholic feeling, it is acting with ends that appear to be political'. The report noted further that 'the Catalanist tendency of almost all is evident'.⁷⁹

A contributory factor to the Catalanisation of the Church was the developments in Rome in the 1960s. The world Catholic Church was itself coming to terms with the profound social, cultural and religious changes of the twentieth century as the period of the Second Vatican Council testified. Unlike the First Vatican Council of 1870, the Second was an attempt by the Church to adapt to social reality rather than declaring religious war on the sins of 'liberalism' and 'materialism'. The Second Vatican Council, first called in 1959 and inaugurated in 1962, was, until completion in 1965, the centre of world Catholic attention and the first project of modernisation undertaken by the Catholic Church. It was also a belated recognition that resistance and rejection of change could no longer be continued.⁸⁰ The initiator of the liberalisation, Pope John XXIII, had declared in 1960 that 'a fundamental cause of unrest in our day is the systematic oppression of the cultural and linguistic characteristics of national minorities', a statement frequently repeated by the Catholic nationalists. Montserrat's delegate to Vatican II, Adalbert Maria Franquesa Garrons, 'showed great satisfaction at the proposal of Paul VI to name the Virgin Mary as Mother of the Church. Like all of the monks of Montserrat, he is a Catalanist, convinced that this region can do more for Catholicism if it is done through Catalanism'.⁸¹

The greatest effect of Vatican II in Catalonia was the authorisation of the mass in the vernacular, which greatly accelerated the slow Catalanisation of those sectors of the Church previously untouched by the use of Catalan in church services.⁸² By this time the extent of linguistic Catalanisation of the Church was, in marked contrast to earlier periods, widespread. According to a church survey, in the dioceses of Girona, Vic, Solsona, Seu d'Urgell, Tarragona and Lleida, 'practically all is in Catalan' while 'due to its [linguistic] complexity' the figures for the dioceses of Barcelona were: Terrasa, 65 per cent of masses in Catalan; Sabadell, 68 per cent; Badalona, 50 per cent; Hospitalet, 50 per cent and the city of Barcelona, 26 per cent.⁸³ The consequences of Vatican II had profound repercussions for Franco's regime and pro-regime Catholicism. Catholicism had been a bastion of the regime since 1939 and the pronouncements of the World Catholic Church appeared to be a rejection of all the religious-ideological inheritance of Spanish National Catholicism. Within the Spanish Catholic Church the initial process of creating Church-regime distance began in Catalonia and the Basque Country. This was made more explicit in March 1964, when 430 Catalan priests sent a collective letter to Catalonia's eight bishops that criticised the submissive role of the Spanish hierarchy, stating that 'the character that continues to be given to our Civil War creates serious difficulties for our pastoral mission amongst the groups and people that do not think like the "victors"'.⁸⁴ This process of gradual erosion of Church support for the dictatorship was particularly traumatic for the regime as one of its self-justifications had been its role as the 'saviour' of religion from 'god-less communism', expressed in the ideology of the 'crusade' during the Civil War.

The emergence of the *Nova Canço* (New Song) movement gave a populist thrust to the Catalanist revival that it had previously lacked. Until the emergence of the *Nova Canço*, Catalan cultural activity had remained a preserve of minorities. The context of the movement's emergence lay within the wider western European territory. The continued economic expansion created by the Keynesian boom also had cultural consequences. The 1960s was marked by the emergence of 'youth' and young people's popular culture as a new social construction. The Spanish economic boom gave to this sector disposable income for the consumption of new products. Catalan youth increasingly converged with its west European counterparts. The concomitant expansion of the mass media began to further erode the regime's strategy of cultural isolation from wider European trends. It is from within these cultural and economic changes that the popular Catalan language song movement is to be located. The *Nova Canço* adopted the Anglo-American type of protest song as its medium. Echoing McLuhan, the medium was the message: what was important about the *Nova Canço* was that the songs were sung in the Catalan language and were a factor in the introduction of the language to many non-Catalan speakers. Prominent within the *Nova Canço* movement was the young Valencian known as Raimon, who came to be seen as a paradigmatic representative of modern Catalan culture.⁸⁵ As Engel has noted, the *Nova Canço* was intended to bridge the divide between mass entertainment and intellectual Catalan culture.⁸⁶

Although the *Nova Canço* was a modern and secular expression of Catalanism, the movement remained subject to the patronage of Catholic-dominated Catalanism. As a reflection of regime schizophrenia towards the onward advance of Catalanism and also a further example of the attempts at incorporating some of its manifestations, in September 1964 Spanish Television announced the creation of a monthly Catalan language programme, which in its first broadcast included a contribution from Raimon. In 1968 Spain withdrew its Eurovision entry because its winner, Joan Manuel Serrat, determined he would sing in Catalan.

Catalan language activities expanded greatly in these years, producing something of a golden age in theatre, literature and publishing.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Abbot Aureli Escarré had played a pivotal role in the slow reconstruction of Catalan Church traditions. In November 1963 Abbot Escarré of Montserrat embarked upon a political confrontation with the regime. This was part of the unravelling of those sectors that had provided it with a bastion of support. These sectors would include the Church, the business class and the younger generation within the army. The public pronouncements of Escarré are to be located within this process. According to *Le Monde*: 'Escarré has been the first authority of the Spanish hierarchy, and perhaps the only one, that has stood up and denounced the contradiction, that according to him exists, between the truth of the Gospel and the Spanish regime.' Amongst the remarks Escarré made were the following:

Where there is no authentic liberty, there is no justice and that is the case with Spain ... the Spanish regime calls itself Christian, but it does not obey the basic principles of Christianity ... History has made of us [i.e., Montserrat] the spiritual centre and the national shrine of Catalonia ... Defending the [Catalan] language is not only a duty, it is a necessity; because when the language is lost, religion also tends to be lost with it, as has happened in other places.⁸⁷

Regime outrage at Escarré's declarations led to constant pressure on the Vatican to replace him and he finally left Montserrat for exile in Italy in 1965. Escarré's *Le Monde* article was widely distributed amongst the opposition and Escarré received a collective letter of support from over 400 Catalan priests.⁸⁸ The widespread nature of the support given to Escarré can be shown through Leftist opposition publications, a further indication of the decline of Catalan anti-clericalism. *Endavant*, the clandestine journal of the *Moviment Socialista de Catalunya* declared: 'We salute the noble words of Abbot Escarré, [which are] a guarantee of a better tomorrow for Catalonia and for the peninsula.' A similar positive assessment of Escarré was published in *ARA*, the publication of the *Front Nacional de Catalunya*.⁸⁹ In July 1963, numerous Catalan intellectuals and prominent figures signed a document directed at the Spanish government, which called for the freedom to teach in Catalan and for the language to be used in the press, television, radio and cinema. The signatories ranged from overt oppositionists to those embedded in the Barcelona political establishment, including industrialists and university professors. The range of

the signatories demonstrated that support for the language was no longer seen as an ipso facto oppositional act.

As has been stated earlier, *Òmnium Cultural*, though imbued with Catholic influence, was not an autonomous organisation of the Catalan Church. This fact made it easier for the regime to make *Òmnium* illegal in December 1963 and was itself a demonstration of the powerful position and privileges of the Church. Until 1939, there had been a strong divide in Catalan political culture between those on the left who saw Catalanism as a bourgeois distraction from the real struggle, which was class based; and those who defined themselves as Catalanist who interpreted anti-Catalanism as *anti-Catalan*. The Franco dictatorship contributed greatly to the dissolution of this dichotomy. The reaction on the left to the closure of *Òmnium Cultural* was indicative of this shift. Though the Catalan Communists of the PSUC had long made support for autonomy a part of their programme, they had remained more distant from involvement in cultural questions. However, the party was unambiguous in its opposition to the prohibition of *Òmnium* by the regime. The PSUC stated that though *Òmnium* was 'a civil society, founded by Felix Millet i Maristany and big Catalan capitalists, which has attempted to place itself at the front of the Catalan national movement ... [Even so] the executive committee of the PSUC energetically protests against this measure because it is a reflection of Francoist hatred towards Catalonia, towards its language and its national culture.'⁹⁰ The prohibition of *Òmnium* was an indication of the confusion that reigned within the regime over its approach towards the incorporation of Catalanism, as the prohibition was removed in 1967. A letter from the Bishop of Seu d'Urgell to Manuel Fraga, the Francoist minister, stated that a group of 'good Catholics from Barcelona', led by Felix Millet i Maristany, 'do not want to see their dearly loved language again in the hands of the enemies of our faith and fatherland'.⁹¹ An ever-more assertive left was now able to compete on the cultural terrain that had previously been dominated by Catholics.

In 1966, the breach in the exclusion of the Catalan communists took place. This occurred with the creation of the *Taula Rodona* (Round Table) and was made possible by a number of factors. Firstly, following de-Stalinisation fear of communism diminished, due to the ideological shifts undertaken by the PCE and PSUC and their abandonment of overt revolutionary demands. Communists no longer called for a Popular Front but rather, citing Carrillo, a 'transitory agreement' which defended the existing political differences between the parties.⁹² It would be this strategy of a 'minimal basis' that would bring about the inclusion of the communists. Secondly, on the national question, the PSUC, following its second party congress in 1965, had called for the re-establishment of the *Estatut* in a 'multi-national state which would maintain the unity of all the peoples of Spain'.⁹³ From 1967 both the PSUC and significantly the CCOO participated in the commemoration of Catalonia's national day, the *Diada*. This provoked fierce criticism from some sectors of the new far-left groupings that had emerged, deeming it a betrayal of 'workers' internationalism' and condemning association with 'bourgeois nationalism'.⁹⁴ However, the dominance of the CCOO in the working class was such that

possible divisions between Catalan and Spanish workers were avoided and it reinforced the position of the CCOO in the anti-Francoist struggle.⁹⁵ Thirdly, the new generation that emerged in the 1960s interpreted anti-communism as an out-of-date discourse. Equally, the older generation had displayed 'a visceral hatred of communism'.⁹⁶ As early as April 1961, Catalan students, representing anarchists, socialists and nationalists and including communists had made a joint political declaration. This collaboration continued in the following years.⁹⁷ For the PSUC, this represented 'a great victory for anti-Francoist unity'.⁹⁸ Both the younger leadership of the MSC in Catalonia and the left nationalist *Front Nacional de Catalunya* condemned 'anachronistic anti-communism'.⁹⁹ In May 1966, PSUC party leader Gregori López Raimundo had called for the definitive closing of the consequences of the Civil War and a round table without exclusions.¹⁰⁰

Whilst the idea for the *Taula Rodona* had come from the communists, its implementation was led by the *Moviment Socialista de Catalunya* in the interior who believed further exclusion of the communists 'was typical of the worst McCarthyism'.¹⁰¹ The MSC experienced a spilt mostly between an aged leadership in exile and those who promoted the *Taula* from within.¹⁰² The origins of the creation of the *Taula* are found with the event known as the *caputxinada* of March 1966 where 500 students met in a monastery in one of the richer areas of Barcelona.¹⁰³ The result was the ending of the regime's dominance in Catalan universities and the creation of an independent student union, significantly under the dominance of the PSUC.¹⁰⁴ Again the importance of the student union was that it was an initiative of the interior and had mass support amongst the student body.¹⁰⁵ With an average age of 20, for students anti-communism meant little beyond the discourse of Francoism. This was followed by a joint declaration by six left Catalan parties denouncing the Francoist organic law and referendum of 1966.¹⁰⁶ The 30 year period of exclusion of the PSUC was at an end and all major opposition campaigns from this point on included the communists.¹⁰⁷ International events challenged communist dominance however. Firstly, the protests of May 1968 had proven to be highly critical of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. This was followed by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Unlike the case of Hungary, both the PCE and the PSUC condemned the action and 'any interference in the internal affairs of the Czech CP'.¹⁰⁸ Following the PCE and PSUC expulsions of dissidents in 1964, party hegemony was increasingly challenged by new Maoist and Trotskyist groupings and the PSUC struggled to retain its previous dominance.¹⁰⁹ Paradoxically, leftist challenge and critique cemented the PSUC's position as a moderate force and facilitated the consolidation of the *Taula*. In December 1969, the *Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya* (Coordinating Commission of the Political Forces of Catalonia) CCFPC was formed. This brought six parties, those from the *Taula Rodona* and the Christian Democrats of *Unió Democràtica* (Democratic Union of Catalonia). The regime was quick to note the 'transcendental importance' of the *Comissió*.¹¹⁰ For the PSUC, the programme of the CCFPC 'essentially coincided with the programme' approved in its Second Party Congress in 1965.¹¹¹

Indeed such was the success of the CCFPC that it sent delegations to other parts of Spain to stimulate the unitary process that had begun in Catalonia.¹¹²

Large-scale immigration of Spanish-speakers produced social changes in Catalan life that had profound consequences for Catalan nationalist discourse. Significantly in this discourse the word immigration was chosen over that of migration, which was a more usual term for intra-state population movement. Catalonia doubled its population between 1930 and 1970, and receiving 250,000 people in the 1940s; 435,000 in the 1950s and during the course of the 1960s, 720,000 new arrivals. The impact of this enormous immigration provoked heated debates amongst Catalan intellectuals as to its impact on Catalan language and culture. For Jordi Pujol, 'our central problem as a country, is not the language or the social question nor economic progress, nor is it a political problem: our central problem is immigration, and therefore, integration'.¹¹³ For the Catalanist intellectual of the 1950s, Raimon Galí, immigration was a part of the anti-Catalan 'conspiracy': 'The foreign invasion begins precisely from the time of the regime's period in Barcelona in 1960'.¹¹⁴ Catalan nationalism adopted the strategy of cultural assimilation for the Spanish-speaking migrants. Although the reception of the new immigrants varied from passive acceptance to expressions of hostility, it was a more measured response than that of the Basque Country. Catalan nationalists were more assured of the vitality of their language and culture than was the case in the Basque territories. Furthermore, Spanish and Catalan were linguistic cousins, allowing for passive knowledge of Catalan after a short time in the territory. The Basque language however was a near insurmountable barrier to the full integration of the new arrivals.

Greater Barcelona was the area of Catalonia most affected by the pattern of migration, but in spite of the arrival of large numbers of Spanish speakers this urban zone continued to contain substantial Catalan speakers.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the Catalan language did not suffer from an association with rural 'backwardness', unlike other territories that attempted a language revival, including Galicia, Brittany and the Ukraine. The contours of the immigration debate in Catalonia were centred around the question of the potential threat to Catalan revivalism. Much less attention was paid to the usually appalling social conditions of the newly arrived, who were normally in a subordinate position to Catalan-speaking bosses and supervisors. The social composition of the Catalan labour force itself experienced transformation: 'As unskilled labourers were brought in to fill the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder, the autochthonous labour force moved up into skilled and managerial positions'.¹¹⁶ For the immigrants, the acquisition of the Catalan language, if not for themselves, for their children, developed an aspirational content. The social and cultural impact of the immigration tended to confirm the Catalan sense of superiority towards the Spanish, as most of those who arrived in Catalonia were usually poorly educated peasants from southern Spain. The reaction to the non-Catalan immigration featured as a subject of debate in *Serra d'Or*, as did reaction to the influential study, *Els Altres Catalans*, which had confirmed the lower level of religiosity of the immigrants, particularly the Andalusians.¹¹⁷

This immigration had a number of important consequences and determined the nature of cultural and political protest in the latter part of the regime.

These years were also marked by increased activity amongst the Catalanist business sectors, who had obtained prominent roles in the Catalan cultural industry. The continued resonance of the project of European construction in the EEC brought together prominent sectors of Catalonia's business class in a forum in July 1964 entitled *Conversaciones Sobre Economía Europea* (Discussions on the European Economy). Amongst the conclusions of the forum held in the town of Mahon in Minorca: 'it is essential to continue to aim, with a realistic, objective and independent spirit, for the maximum convergence between the socio-economic institutions of a united Europe and our country . . . Our country [Spain] has begun economic liberalisation within the OECD . . . as an initial step towards the entrance of Spain into wider-reaching economic spaces'.¹¹⁸ These views were echoed in the third Costa Brava forum, held in 1965, which reflected concern regarding the disparity between Spain and the EEC.¹¹⁹ The emergence of modern mass tourism in this period accelerated the growth of a new service sector and also saw business sectors lobby for economic modernisation in transport infrastructure.

The *Banca Catalana*, in its own financial and economic review of 1965 echoed these sentiments. '[It is] our firm conviction that the economic future of Spain depends on Europe . . . Europe is the decisive factor'.¹²⁰ This anxiety on the part of these business sectors was noted by the state security services: 'In spite of the fact that . . . the enormous numbers of tourists arriving to our *Patria* [fatherland] has made people optimistic', there was also a tone of 'pessimism' regarding the issue of Spanish exports due 'to the restrictive measures adopted by the Common Market towards countries that are not a part of it, such as Spain'.¹²¹ Although this sector had benefitted from the expansion of the Spanish economy, the years that followed were marked by an enormous increase in working-class labour militancy not seen since the Spanish Second Republic of the 1930s.¹²² Both sectors of Catalan business, Catalanist and the more conservative regionalists, would come to share the view that it was vital to transform the Franco regime. Their differences were over the attainment of this transformation, but within the Catalanist sector, a new project was emerging. This was the strategy that became known as 'Constructing Catalonia'.¹²³

Most theorists of nationalism acknowledge a linkage between the emergence of nationalism and changes in the political economy.¹²⁴ As Greenfeld has noted, 'the sustained orientation of economic activity to growth . . . owes its existence to nationalism'.¹²⁵ The second half of the 1960s was marked by enormous international investment in the Catalan economy, drawn there by low labour costs and by the belief that the Franco dictatorship provided the necessary stability for economic expansion. This investment was stimulated by the continued internationalisation of the western European economies, and the parallel integration of Spain into this process.¹²⁶ This internationalisation of capital and the emergence of the multinationals during the period of the post-war boom eroded inter-state boundaries and stimulated increased regional

protests.¹²⁷ The revival of Catalanist sentiment within the Catalan business sector can be interpreted as motivated by a need to mobilise to defend its interests. Though each nationalist movement developed the discourse that best served the economic and cultural situation in which it found itself, the large-scale expansion of the Catalanist movement occurred during the era that has become known as 'neo-nationalism'. This process extended through varied territories of the world and included challenges to already existing states in territories as diverse as Quebec, Wales and Kurdistan.¹²⁸ Catalan business anxiety centred on two areas. Firstly, as we have seen, the continued exclusion of Spain from the EEC. Secondly, the threat to indigenous business posed by the international intrusion into the Spanish economy. In the period 1939 to 1960, Catalan business had remained greatly protected by the Franco regime from the full impact of international competition.¹²⁹ Furthermore, one of the early functions of the dictatorship had been to discipline the labour force and prevent it challenging the new economic order. The regime, unable to modernise from within, saw how the Spanish economic boom increased popular dissatisfaction with housing and labour conditions and raised demand for access to the new consumer products its economic model created.

The final ten years of the Franco dictatorship were a period marked by popular democratisation and the reconstitution and vertiginous expansion of civil society. This reconstitution ranged from a proliferation of *sardana* clubs and choral societies to new forms such as the neighbourhood associations. The emergence of the student protest movement was another component of this process. Enormous cultural shifts occurred throughout Europe, brought about by the massification of the university system, exemplified in a new non-privileged generation, who, whether in Berlin, Belfast or Barcelona, were prepared to engage and challenge both dictatorial and liberal-democratic regimes. These processes of the reconstitution of Catalan civil society caused a certain marginalisation of the Church. This relative marginalisation was compounded by a crisis from within. The Church became clearly divided below the hierarchy between those politicised on the left, who developed close relations with the Communist-dominated *Comissions Obreres* and the more politically conservative Catalanists. The progressive sector of the Catalan Church, through its adoption of Leftist ideology, clashed more profoundly with the security apparatus of the Franco state. Both groups remained attached to the policy of re-Christianisation but were divided in the manner that this could be achieved. On the one hand, those in the social 'wing' of the Church continued to attach great importance to the Catalan language but their charitable work in areas that were usually comprised of Spanish-speaking immigrants made them more cautious about Catalanising the workers. As the veil was lifted on the reality of Francoism in Catalonia, due to a new period of relative press freedom, it became apparent that the re-Christianisation of the Catalan populace, undertaken with varying degrees of intensity since 1939, had failed.

Strikingly, most secular nationalists and Leftists did not challenge the Church or its predominance in the continued reconstruction of Catalan cultural life. While in the years up to the mid 1960s there had been very good

reasons for the failure of the pre-1939 secular strain of Catalanism to re-emerge in any strength, in this final period of the dictatorship it was perhaps more surprising. However, the Catalan Communists of the PSUC and the emergent Leftist groupings incorporated, in some sense, Catalanist traditions. As Miró noted in 1967, 'at this time all of the leading working-class activists ... have become conscious of the rights and desires of the Catalan people'.¹³⁰ In marked contrast to the period pre-1939, anti-Church and anti-clerical rhetoric was no longer a part of this discourse. These years were also marked by continued 'Catalanisation' in all mediums. The Catalanist content of magazines expanded greatly after the relative liberalisation provided by Manuel Fraga's press law of 1966. The mid 1960s witnessed the relaxation of state censorship in countries like Spain, Britain and the USA, though taboos remained. In Spain, though Marxist and Leftist books became increasingly available post-1966, criticism of Franco, the army or the *Guardia Civil* remained areas subject to severe censure. The growth of conflict with the regime required new agencies to meet the resurgent labour movement. This led to the creation of the *Tribunal de Orden Público* (Public Order Tribunal) in 1968. Franco had himself accused the government of weakness over its response to disturbances at the University of Barcelona in 1966.¹³¹ In 1969, the hardening of the regime was a strong indication that popular quiescence had not been achieved through the creation of a consumerist economy. The final decade of the regime was marked by unprecedented challenge by the forces of the opposition given the belief that Franco, already in his 70s, would soon be dead.

In the 30 year period since the Civil War the vitality and the revival of Catalan print culture can be demonstrated by the following figures for books published in Catalan: 1942, 4; 1947, 53; 1954, 96; 1963, 208 and by 1967 the figure had reached 465. In the period before the mid 1950s, the overwhelming number of works published were on subjects of religious interest or by known Catholics. The years that followed saw the medium of Catalan expand into all areas of Catalan social, cultural and economic life. However, although the Catalanist movement had made enormous and almost certainly irreversible gains, important grievances remained. These centred around continued prohibitions on the public use of Catalan; the non-existence of a Catalan press; the continued censorship of books; the prohibition of the Catalan national flag, the *senyera*; the prohibition of *Òmnium Cultural* and, perhaps above all, the continued exclusion of Catalan from primary, secondary and university education.¹³² The mid 1960s are marked throughout the Spanish state by the creation of new magazines and newspapers. In 1966 the *Tele/eXprés* group launched *Tele/Estel*, which was the first officially authorised Catalan language (and non-Church) magazine since 1939. This new publication represented a shift in the dynamic of the regime: a news magazine was to operate which was not published in the language of the 'Empire'.¹³³ It was notable for its political caution, and represented a recognition by the regime that work in Catalan could be supportive of the status quo rather than threatening it. Its 'apoliticism' was such that it ignored the debates around the regime referendum of 1966.¹³⁴

Initially, *Tele/Estel* sold around 80,000 copies but by 1968–1969 its sales fluctuated between 25,000 and 50,000. These limited sales were due to its essentially conservative nature at a time of popular radicalisation and the greater availability and range of the clandestine press. One commentator has remarked that what was notable about *Tele/Estel* was that it was 'a Francoist weekly'.¹³⁵

Two events of the mid 1960s that demonstrated the changing Church role in Catalonia were the episodes known as the *caputxinada* and the *capellans* march of 1966. The *caputxinada* refers to the meeting of the constituent assembly of the *Sindicat Democràtic d'Estudiants* (Democratic Students' Union) held in March 1966 at the residence of the Capuchin monks in Sarrià, Barcelona. This meeting was surrounded by a police cordon and those inside remained there for two days. What was notable, apart from the creation of an independent student union, was the use of a Church centre for this purpose. Following the *caputxinada*, religious buildings and the monastery of Montserrat became the most likely centres for meetings of a whole series of opposition groups, ranging from students to the *Comissions Obreres*. The event known as the *capellans* march took place in May 1966, when over a 100 priests marched to the police station in Via Laietana in the centre of Barcelona to deliver a protest over police brutality towards a student, Joaquim Boix. Significantly, this student was also a member of the PSUC. The police harassment of those who participated was a cause of profound shock and resonated widely throughout the Catholic community.¹³⁶ The apparent inviolability of clerics had been over-turned. That a regime that defined itself as Catholic could show such a lack of reverence towards a group of clerics cemented the idea within the Leftist opposition that the Church could become an ally.¹³⁷ Twenty-two Catalan Catholic groups subscribed to a protest at the irreverence shown by the regime.¹³⁸ It was clear that the Church-regime alliance was rapidly dissolving in Catalonia.

The transformed status of Catalan culture was confirmed throughout 1968 by the conferences and ceremonies in homage of Pompeu Fabra, seen as the founding father of the modern Catalan language. Pompeu Fabra had modernised and standardised Catalan in the early years of the twentieth century and his dictates over the language remained central to modern Catalan orthography. Significantly, he focused his linguistic work on areas of Catalonia where the language was least affected by the influence of Spanish. It was also notable that official aid and encouragement was given.¹³⁹ For the forces of Catalan Communism, these developments produced concerns that they would empty 'Catalanist activity of its anti-Francoist content'.¹⁴⁰ The Barcelona dailies, *La Vanguardia* and *El Correo Catalán*, greatly increased the number of articles devoted to Catalan culture after 1966 and *El Correo*, from the late 1960s, contained regular columns in Catalan itself. Certain areas were not touched by this shift and they inevitably included the Francoist taboos of the Spanish Republic and the *Generalitat* of the 1930s, though academic studies on these periods would begin to appear.

As an indication of the regime's changing approach towards Catalan culture, the cultural umbrella organisation *Òmnium Cultural* had its legal

status restored in 1967. Its centrality in Catalan cultural life was confirmed in 1968 when over 90 entities of Catalan civil society announced their affiliation to it.¹⁴¹ By 1969, *Òmnium* had over 2,200 members, with 50 joining it every week. In the same year *Òmnium* created the *Delegació d'Ensenyament de Català* (The Catalan Teaching Section), which by 1975 had trained over 2,000 teachers of Catalan.¹⁴²

The Catalan language was the starting point for all of the activities promoted by *Òmnium*, which stated in 1969, 'the language is the indispensable primary material and spontaneous manifestation of the thought of a people'.¹⁴³ The centrality of the language in its work ensured that *Òmnium* was at the forefront of the campaign that came to be known as *Català a l'Escola* (Catalan in schools). Whilst in 1960 it would have been unimaginable to see a broad-based campaign for the teaching of Catalan in schools, this became possible from around 1965. The Franco regime conceded that it would have to contain Catalanism, as its attempt at suppression, though vigorously pursued for many years, had to be abandoned. The *Català a l'Escola* campaign was supported and patronised by *Òmnium Cultural*, the monastery of Montserrat and the *Banca Catalana*. From the mid 1960s the campaign for the Catalan language to feature in the educational system would be an essential component of Catalanist activity until the regime's end.

Assimilation of immigrants had become the aim of Catalanism, and what this signified more than anything else was their adoption of the Catalan language. *Òmnium Cultural*, the boy scouts and various cultural entities had been responsible for those who had learnt to read and write Catalan in the 1960s, but their success depended on voluntary enrolment. It was the state's central role in the educational system and its power of compulsion which energised the *Català a l'Escola* campaign. The visible prominence attained by the campaign was one of the many elements that demonstrated that, after the advances of the early 1960s, Catalanist campaigns were aimed at the ever greater conquest of public space. *Català a l'Escola* used the methods adopted by Catalanists throughout the dictatorship, which ranged from the scattering of leaflets, graffiti and, even the distribution of stickers to be attached to cars.¹⁴⁴ Catalanisation reached areas previously immune due to their relative isolation from the centres of campaigning, which was invariably in or near the city of Barcelona. As the regime's security service the DGS noted, in one particular instance, 'It is significant ... that Spanish speakers, whose origin is from diverse regions of Spain, have registered'.¹⁴⁵ The involvement of immigrants in these courses was also an indication that any attempted re-mobilisation around a revived discourse of neo-*Lerrouxisme* would be unlikely to be successful.

An echo of a conflict that occurred under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s was provided in 1966 by the campaign that became known as *Volem Bisbes Catalans* (We Want Catalan Bishops). The nomination of Catalan bishops had been a constant demand of Catholics at earlier periods in the century, but the Francoist monolith silenced it throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Its revival was stimulated by the nomination of the non-Catalan Marcelo González Martín as Assistant Archbishop of Barcelona in February

1966.¹⁴⁶ The campaign was also stimulated by the changes in Church-state relations brought on by Vatican II. It centred on the view that the regime-approved nomination of the bishop went against decrees of the Vatican Council which had stated that the Church was to be independent of all state authority.¹⁴⁷ For the Vatican, however, Spain remained one of the most important Catholic states and Franco retained his power over the nomination of bishops until his death. For those behind the campaign *Volem Bisbes Catalans*, the appointment of González Martín was interpreted as an anti-Catalan stratagem on the part of the regime. The Bishopric of Barcelona was the most important in Catalonia and was the second largest in western Europe. The territory of the Bishopric also included the monastery of Montserrat and all of the linked organisations it had built up.¹⁴⁸ In February 1965, an open letter from 33 of Catalonia's principal Catholic groupings was directed to all of the priests of the Barcelona dioceses. The central concern of this letter was the linguistic situation in the city of Barcelona, where at this point 37 per cent of masses were in Catalan. The expansion in the number of masses in Catalan initiated in the 1950s had stalled under the impact of the arrival of large numbers of Spanish-speaking immigrants. The appointment of González Martín was seen as a threat to the process of re-Catalanisation within the Church, which continued to be seen as fundamental for the re-Christianisation of the populace.¹⁴⁹

The call for Catalan bishops joined the list of demands that could be conceded by the regime without radical transformation in its order. '[We] want Catalan in the schools, the press, the radio and television; we want the return of Abbot Escarré to Catalonia and all of those who are the defenders of our national rights; we want Catalan bishops'.¹⁵⁰ Unlike other campaigns this one did not attract much interest on the part of the left, obviously because it was perceived as purely religious and was not seen to represent an attack on Catalan national identity. Although the left consciously distanced itself from the *Volem Bisbes Catalans* movement, its transformed relationship with Catholicism and its invocation of the Church as a 'national' Church was cemented by the death and burial of Aureli Escarré in October 1968, which was held at the monastery of Montserrat.¹⁵¹ The Franco regime was responsible for a profound shift of alliances within the Catalan political and cultural community. Aureli Escarré in death had become a national representative of Catalonia. Escarré was given a funeral homage that almost amounted to a lying in state. Almost all of the Catalan opposition had some presence at his funeral. This ranged from the *Front Nacional de Catalunya* to *Unió Democràtica* and *Comissions Obreres*. The *Front* publication, *ARA*, produced its own supplement on the death of Abbot Escarré. 'Men such as the Abbot of Catalonia have made possible this gradual raising of the conscience', on the part of the Catalan people. For the FNC, Escarré was, 'profoundly rooted in the essences of the people' and had become 'one of the symbols of a persecuted and humiliated *Pàtria*' who has taken on the dimension of a 'primary Catalan national figure'.¹⁵² Amongst the opposition, this almost universal recognition of the figure of Escarré can be compared to the Polish anti-regime left's close association with Cardinal Wysinski in the 1970s.

Within the Catalan opposition the battle for ideological hegemony continued to be fought out between Catholic-led nationalism and the varied strands of the left. The largest component of this Catalan left were the orthodox Communists of the PSUC and a range of neo-Leninist and Trotskyist groups. In comparison with the 1930s, the notable absentee was the anarchist movement of the CNT, which had been unable to reconstitute itself and was displaced by the *Comissions Obreres*. Within the revolutionary left of the period, as with their west European counterparts, there existed the firm conviction that the transformation of the capitalist order was imminent. The least revolutionary component of the radical left, the PSUC, had also led the way in the positioning of the left as inheritors of Catalanism. In one sense then, almost all of the opposition to the regime within Catalonia had become Catalanist by the late 1960s. Almost all of the old and new left shared the minimum goal of Catalan autonomy, opposition to which would have placed the left on the side of the Franco regime. Colomer has argued that there was a feeling on the left that it monopolised Catalanism.¹⁵³ In the final era of the dictatorship, the repressive apparatus of the state focussed on the increasingly organised working class, centred in the Communist-led *Comissions Obreres* which was declared illegal in 1968. This period was one of great influence of the New Left culturally and politically, though the influence on the nationalist sector was not great. A minority within radical nationalism sought to create a left-based national liberation movement.¹⁵⁴ Their project was influenced by the culture of 'third-worldism' on the radical left of the period, which argued that territories such as Catalonia were 'exploited' nationally and economically by the Spanish state. However, this discourse had little resonance. In this their argument was little different from that of 'bourgeois' Catalanism: 'A draining of capital from Catalonia to the rest of Spain would tend to slow the growth of Catalonia, without necessarily producing more rapid growth in any other part of Spain.'¹⁵⁵ The revolutionary nationalist left remained extremely marginal, largely due to the enormous social and cultural changes in Catalonia produced by the mass immigration of Spanish speakers. The Catalan middle class remained wedded to a liberal nationalism, whilst the largely non-indigenous working class was mobilised principally by the Communists, who, though strongly supportive of Catalan autonomy, were more cautious on the subject of the Catalan language and the Catalanisation of the workers. In one sense the PSUC and *Comissions Obreres* protected the Spanish-speaking workers from compulsory linguistic transfer, and in exchange these workers agreed to support Catalan autonomy and national rights as an essential component of opposition demands.

The most active Catalanist sectors within the orbit of Catholicism developed their own distinct project in response to the economic and social changes brought about during the course of the 1960s. Jordi Pujol came to be representative of a new strain of Catalan businessmen who, through their intensely felt Catalan identity, devoted themselves to a deepening and strengthening of the rapidly reconstituting Catalan national community. This new wave within Catalan business was centred on a sector of the financial community and

nationalists in publishing, the *Nova Canço* industry and the essentially petit-bourgeois components of Catalan business whose markets were in the territory of Catalonia. These individuals were prepared to use a part of their profits in the financing and influencing of Catalanist cultural projects. As the police noted: 'The new strategy of Catalanism . . . is [that of] initiating an audacious escalation within the financial and economic terrain.'¹⁵⁶ This component of the Catalan business class led by Pujol became associated with a project that came to be known as *Fer País* (lit. making a country), which meant a strategy of national reconstruction in economic and cultural terms. Pujol came to personify this programme as the representative of those that wished to avoid direct and open confrontation with the regime.¹⁵⁷ In a semi-clandestine conference held at Montserrat in 1968 it was stated that, 'there is no other road than that of the construction of Catalonia'.¹⁵⁸ The main individuals involved in the *Banca Catalana* saw it as a patriotic bank. In the bank's annual report of 1969 it was stated that '*Banca Catalana* is a Catalan bank, which means it is a bank that is located in Catalonia, that has its decision-making in Catalonia, and that responds to a Catalan vision of the economy'.¹⁵⁹ The central project of *Fer País* was the re-construction of the Catalan economy and its modernisation.¹⁶⁰ Concerns over the Catalan economy and its future development were also shared within the main forums of Catalan business: 'the lack of territorial organisation in Catalonia introduces a high degree of uncertainty . . . as it makes long-term planning almost impossible.'¹⁶¹

In 1965, Andreu Ribera Rovira, a leading industrialist, became president of the *Cámara de Industria* (Chamber of Industry). He maintained good relations with important members of the Madrid government, particularly the architect of economic liberalisation, the Catalan Laureano López Rodó. Individuals such as Ribera Rovira came to function as bridges between Catalanists and reformists at the epicentre of the regime. An organisation that bridged the two sectors was the *Cercle d'Economia*. The *Cercle* published an internal document in 1968 that stated the concerns of the business class at a time of increasing working-class mobilisation: 'Although we are living in a climate of public order and considerable economic development, it is at the same time, a grave and dangerous situation . . . our future is uncertain, [and] without any guarantee of stability when the current head of state disappears.'¹⁶²

The projects of *Fer País* and the 'construction' of Catalonia were part of the wave of regionalist responses to the transformations of the 1960s. The new phase of economic modernisation was itself symbolised in 1965 by the emergence of the Franco-Spanish plans for nuclear power stations, which were due to open in 1973. Of these, four opened in the province of Tarragona, two in Vandellós and two in Ascó. These agents of economic modernisation, were seen by those involved in the campaigns of 'Constructing Catalonia' as an important contribution to Catalan modernisation. Even so, the consensus remained amongst Catalanists that Francoism retarded this modernisation. The *Fer País* Catalanists were in the vanguard of calls for the rational reform of the Francoist state. During the late 1960s, Francoism increasingly showed itself to be unable to cope with the transformed social, cultural and political Spanish